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20 February 1976

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Proposals for Providing Warning to
the Sinai Field Mission

REFERENCE : USIB-M-715, 10 February 1976, Item 1

1. The attached memorandum on the subject from Mr. Knoche is circulated to USIB for information.

2. As indicated in the USIB discussion at the 10 February meeting, we are advised that Mr. William C. Kontos, Director of Sinai Support Mission, will forward a report on the adequacies of safeguards to protect intelligence information at the Sinai Field Mission as soon as it is available.



Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Exempt from general
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Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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20 February 1976

Intelligence Community Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Sinai Support Mission

SUBJECT: Proposals for Providing Warning to
the Sinai Field Mission

1. Pursuant to the briefing presented at the USIB meeting on 10 February, the Intelligence Community Staff has addressed the subject of warning procedures which will ensure that the Sinai Field Mission will be informed of any activities or events that appear likely to affect the safety of the US personnel assigned to it. Inasmuch as the Department of State Operations Center will, in most cases, be the actual transmitter of alert information to the Sinai Field Mission and since the Department of Defense will undertake emergency evacuation of US personnel, we propose that the following general procedures be adopted for proper warning notification.

2. The primary warning mechanism should be the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers' Net (NOIWON) which connects the seven intelligence/operations watch centers in the Washington area (CIA, DIA, NSA, J-3, Stato, State/INR, and the White House). The State Department Operations Center would have primary, but not exclusive, responsibility to insure that the Sinai Field Mission would be advised of any information received that related to or directly affected the safety of US personnel. This would include such alerting advisories as a CRITIC, an Alert Memorandum, an NSA SIGINT Alert, a Strategic


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Warning Notice, a White House Spot Report (WHSR) and a DIA Warning Appraisal. Other information which, in the judgment of individual Community watch officers, would appear to be of sufficient importance to justify advising the Sinai Field Mission, but not warrant a NOIWON conference, should be transmitted directly to the State Operations Center for appropriate action. When appropriate--i.e., when it appears that the information should reach the Mission as soon as possible--a NOIWON conference should be established as outlined in the attached procedures.

3. All elements of the Intelligence Community should be apprised of the State Operations Center's primary warning responsibility and establish proper procedures to insure no delay occurs in alerting the State Operations Center of possible and probable activities and events that affect the safety of US personnel assigned to the Sinai Field Mission. Likewise, in order to properly support the Mission, it would be useful if the Sinai Support Mission could provide appropriate Intelligence Community elements with information describing the functions of the Mission, its staffing, location of the site(s) and the kinds of communications available to it.

4. As a related matter, procedures have been established which will provide Intelligence Community support concerning the daily intelligence summaries prepared by State/INR for dispatch to the Sinai Field Mission.


E. H. Knoche
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

19 February 1976

Attachment:

The Use of the NOIWON

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The Use of the National Operations and Intelligence Watch
Officers Net (NOIWON)

1. The NOIWON is a secure telephone conferencing net connecting seven intelligence/operations watch centers in the Washington area (CIA, NSA, DIA, J-3, State, State/IEA and White House). The primary function of the NOIWON is to permit the immediate exchange of any information which appears to any member to be of sufficient importance to initiate a conference.

2. NOIWON Conference. A NOIWON Conference will be established under the following conditions:

a. On the receipt of an initial CRITIC message by any member of the net.

b. On receipt of any subsequent related CRITIC or CRITIC FOLLOW-UP which, in the judgment of any NOIWON member, requires a conference.

c. On receipt of any intelligence or other information (including the plans, decisions, or actions by the US Government or its allies) which, in the judgment of any NOIWON member, requires a conference.

d. On receiving information concerning a change in DEFCON to 3, 2, or 1, any type of NATO alert, or any decision concerning the release of nuclear weapons.

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e. When any NOLWON member alerts his own top-level principals to critical information during non-normal duty hours. (USIB-D-71.11/11)

f. On the initiation of Community alerting advisories (e.g., a Strategic Warning Notice, Alert Memoranda, NSA SIGINT Alert).

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